ASSETS RECOVEREDE FROM ORGANIZED CRIME: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO REPAIR AND REBUILD THE SOCIAL FABRIC

The New Purpose of Buildings Recovered from Drug Trafficking, Sects, and Human Trafficking Networks

The national government approved, through DNU 575/2025, a new regime for the conservation, administration, and disposal of assets derived from illicit activities. The new regulation ignores the State’s obligation to repair the harm suffered by the direct and indirect victims of these crimes, and instead establishes a policy that values only the economic worth of recovered assets as a revenue strategy for the State.

The confiscation of assets originating from crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering, or corruption is a powerful tool to weaken criminal organizations economically, but not to finance the administrative shortcomings of the State. Its true potential lies in the reuse of these assets by the State and social organizations to benefit the people and communities most affected, initiating a process of repairing the harm and rebuilding the social fabric that has been attacked. When victims are not considered, the initiative loses its very meaning.

Several provisions in this decree are of utmost gravity, as they affect both victim reparation and the possibility of establishing an effective and transparent system of administration and reuse:

1. The approval of a reform and the repeal of multiple criminal laws through a DNU, especially without demonstrating the necessity and urgency required, is contrary to Article 99, paragraph 3 of the National Constitution and to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. This is even more serious considering that, for more than three years, Congress has had before it a bill to create a system for the administration and reuse of seized and confiscated assets. That bill was agreed upon by nearly all political blocs (Unión por la Patria, La Libertad Avanza, PRO, UCR, Hacemos Coalición Federal, and Innovación Federal), along with social organizations and judicial operators, and still awaits debate in committees chaired by the governing party itself. 

2. The new regime reduces assets to their mere economic value, ignoring their potential for reparation. By failing to prioritize social reuse, it limits itself to granting monetary restitution of assets to some state agencies, disregarding the victims who are not part of judicial proceedings and wasting a policy that would allow the State to grant their use to different institutions and social organizations such as rehabilitation centers, neighborhood clubs, and community associations—thus avoiding its responsibility for reparation.

   
   

3. The DNU establishes no mechanisms for transparency or accountability, opening the door to discretionary decisions and possible acts of corruption. The regime sets no objective criteria for administering, safeguarding, disposing of, or granting concessions over assets, nor does it require transparency of information that would enable institutional and citizen monitoring throughout the process. There have been numerous cases where seized and confiscated assets were administered arbitrarily and for clientelist purposes, generating major costs for both the State and society.

   
   

4. It duplicates already existing institutional structures, causing overlapping functions and losses for the State. Less than a month ago, the Supreme Court updated its own regime for the administration and reuse of seized and confiscated assets (Ruling 22/2025). The new system repeats mistakes: it lacks a single authority and produces overlapping roles, leading to greater expenses, reduced effectiveness, and the impossibility of building an adequate tool.

   
   

The social reuse of assets is a strategic policy to weaken organized crime, repair victims, and rebuild citizens’ trust in democratic institutions. Countries that implemented it seriously managed to weaken criminal groups economically and strengthen institutional legitimacy and democratic life by directly allocating these assets to institutions and the territories most affected. The fight against organized crime cannot be reduced to a revenue-raising mechanism for the State.

Through the Bien Restituido project, we have worked for the past five years with all legislative blocs, held discussions with various national and provincial officials, and jointly drafted a bill that remains stalled in Congress. We call for this policy to be built in an integral, transparent, and participatory way, involving not only a branch of the State but also the communities and organizations that face the consequences of organized crime daily in the most affected territories.